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Abstract 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission nuclear power plant licensees and new reactor 
applicants are required to provide protection of their plants against radiological sabo-
tage, including the placement of vital equipment in vital areas.  This document de-
scribes a systematic process for the identification of the minimum set of areas that 
must be designated as vital areas in order to ensure that all radiological sabotage sce-
narios are prevented.  Vital area identification involves the use of logic models to sys-
tematically identify all of the malicious acts or combinations of malicious acts that 
could lead to radiological sabotage.  The models available in the plant probabilistic 
risk assessment and other safety analyses provide a great deal of the information and 
basic model structure needed for the sabotage logic model.  Once the sabotage logic 
model is developed, the events (or malicious acts) in the model are replaced with the 
areas in which the events can be accomplished.  This sabotage area logic model is 
then analyzed to identify the target sets (combinations of areas the adversary must 
visit to cause radiological sabotage) and the candidate vital area sets (combinations of 
areas that must be protected against adversary access to prevent radiological sabo-
tage).  Any one of the candidate vital area sets can be selected for protection.  Appro-
priate selection criteria will allow the licensee or new reactor applicant to minimize 
the impacts of vital area protection measures on plant safety, cost, operations, or other 
factors of concern. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Nuclear power plants contain large inventories of radioactive materials that could, if released, 
cause radiological hazards to workers, the public, and the environment.  Any deliberate act di-
rected against a nuclear power plant that could directly or indirectly endanger public health and 
safety by exposure to radiation is defined in 10 CFR 73.2 as radiological sabotage. [Ref. 1]  10 
CFR 73.55 specifies requirements for protection of nuclear power plants against radiological 
sabotage, including the location of vital equipment in vital areas and protection measures to be 
applied to vital areas. [Ref. 2]  It is therefore necessary for each nuclear power reactor licensee 
and new reactor applicant to identify the vital areas to which the required protection measures 
will be applied.  This document provides guidance on a method that can be used by licensees and 
new reactor applicants to identify nuclear power reactor vital areas. 
 
The initial basis for vital area identification was U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
Review Guideline 17, which required that essentially all safety-related equipment be considered 
vital.  The review guideline referenced NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29, “Seismic Design Classifica-
tion,” and suggested that all equipment that required seismic protection should be designated as 
vital and enclosed within a vital area.  However, the Review Guideline 17 standards were not 
uniformly applied during the reviews of some of the initial facility and license applicant vital 
area designations.  The NRC initiated research studies to develop systematic methods for identi-
fying vital areas at nuclear power reactors. [Ref. 3, 4]   The key concepts that emerged from those 
studies include the use of logic models (fault trees) to determine the events that can cause release 
from a plant, replacing the events in the fault trees with the locations from which they can be ac-
complished, and solving the fault trees to generate (1) the combinations of locations which must 
be visited to complete sabotage scenarios (target sets) and (2) the combinations of locations that, 
if protected, will prevent all possible sabotage scenarios (prevention sets).  The methods were 
applied to all U.S. nuclear power plants during the late 1970s and early 1980s. [Ref. 5]  In 1985 
an NRC committee issued its recommendations and basic assumptions for vital area identifica-
tion in NUREG-1178. [Ref. 6]  The NUREG-1178 approach recommended that vital areas be 
defined as the set of areas that must be protected to prevent radiological sabotage rather than as 
the set of areas containing all safety-related equipment as specified in Review Guideline 17.  
This approach was considered by NRC but was not formally adopted at that time. 
 
The NRC reconsidered the approach recommended in NUREG-1178 in 1999.  At that time, the 
Commissioners directed the NRC staff to develop a plan to modify the regulations to require 
power reactor facilities to identify sets of equipment that must be protected to maintain safe op-
eration or for safe shutdown of the plant. [Ref. 7]  The NRC developed a plan to accomplish this 
rule with a scheduled completion date in 2002.1  The progress of this regulatory initiative was 
disrupted by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which caused the NRC to:  
                                                 
1 The identification of such equipment sets was incorporated into the NRC Operational Safeguards Response 
Evaluation program as specified by NRC Inspection Procedure 81110, “Operational Safeguards Response Evalua-
tion (OSRE),” dated September 8, 2000. 
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1. issue Federal Orders and advisories to its facilities to strengthen their capabilities and 
readiness to respond to a potential attack on a nuclear facility;  
2. assess the adequacy of security measures specified in the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR) and implemented at licensed facilities;  
3. conduct a comprehensive review of its safeguards and security programs; and 
4. codify the measures listed above and lessons learned from the reviews in a revision of 10 
CFR 73.55. 
 
As of 2008, the NRC has received an increase in design certification applications for nuclear 
power plants and has also received over 20 combined license applications.  With this renewed 
emphasis in building new facilities and the revised provisions of 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC 
deemed it appropriate to update its guidance for identifying vital areas at nuclear power plants.  
This document provides the updated guidance. 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this document is to describe a structured process that can be used to identify the 
areas of a nuclear power plant that should be designated as vital areas.  The set of vital areas 
identified using this process should be provided with the protection measures specified in 10 
CFR 73.55 to reduce the risk of radiological sabotage.  The vital area identification process is 
based on the information contained in the following documents: 
• NUREG-1178 (Vital Equipment/Area Guidelines Study: Vital Area Committee Report) 
[Ref.6], 
• Draft IAEA-NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES-XXXX (Identification of Vital Areas at 
Nuclear Facilities) [Ref. 8] 
• SAND2004-2866 (A Systematic Method for Identifying Vital Areas at Complex Nuclear 
Facilities) [Ref. 9], 
• NUREG/CR-0809 (Fault Tree Analysis for Vital Area Identification) [Ref. 4], and 
• Nuclear Power Plant Security Assessment Format and Content Guide [Ref. 10]. 
 
1.3 Scope 
The process described in this document deals with the identification and selection of vital areas 
for commercial nuclear power plants; however, the basic approach could be applicable to other 
nuclear facilities (e.g., a fuel reprocessing facility).  The focus of this document is on updating, 
consolidating, and integrating the information already contained in the documents identified in 
Section 1.2 above. 
1.4 Report Organization 
Section 1 provides an introduction to the document.  Section 2 presents the set of assumptions 
that are used in the performance of a Vital Area Identification (VAI) analysis for commercial 
nuclear power plants.  Section 3 describes the VAI process in detail.  Section 4 describes the 
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documentation requirements for VAI.  Section 5 provides a brief conclusion.  References are 
listed in Section 6. 
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2. VITAL AREA IDENTIFICATION ASSUMPTIONS 
This section provides the assumptions upon which licensees should base their VAI analyses.   
1. In order to prevent radiological sabotage of a nuclear power plant it is necessary to pre-
vent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage.  Vital areas should be identified so 
as to protect a minimum set of the systems, personnel, and equipment needed to prevent 
significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage. 
The radiological sabotage criterion for inventories of material other than the reactor core 
and the spent fuel pool is a release of radioactive material in excess of 10 CFR Part 100 
[Ref. 11] limits.2  A minimum set of equipment needed to prevent releases in excess of 
Part 100 limits from inventories of radioactive material other than the core and the spent 
fuel pool must also be protected in vital areas.   
2. All distinct operating states (power operation, hot standby, cold standby, and refueling) 
must be addressed in the vital area identification process.  Different operational states 
may rely on different equipment to perform safety functions and may require protection 
of different areas to ensure protection against sabotage.  A set of vital areas may be iden-
tified for each operational state or a bounding set of vital areas that provides protection 
during all operating states can be selected.  The latter approach may be advantageous 
from a physical protection standpoint to minimize or eliminate the need for reconfiguring 
physical protection measures when the operational states change.3 
3. In building logic models for the VAI analysis, it is not necessary to assume that a vital 
equipment maintenance outage occurs concurrently with an attack. Vital equipment 
maintenance outages that occur during operations should be addressed as specified in 
Reference 10, Volume 3 and may require the implementation of compensatory measures 
such as designating and protecting alternate vital areas containing redundant equipment. 
4. It is not necessary to assume that a random failure of vital equipment occurs concurrently 
with an attack. 
5. Credit can be taken for operator actions if all of the following conditions are met: 
a. There is sufficient time to implement the actions between the sabotage act(s) and 
the onset of core damage or spent fuel melting. 
                                                 
2 The dispersal of unirradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel may or may not produce exposures that exceed 10 CFR Part 
100 limits depending upon the Pu concentration and other factors.  However, because unirradiated MOX fuel could 
be a target for theft, the area in which any inventory of such fuel is stored should be protected in the same manner as 
vital areas, regardless of the potential for a release exceeding 10 CFR Part 100 limits. 
3 There may be exceptions to this generalization.  For example, a facility may need to be in a specific operational 
state for an extended period of time and a VAI may show that a specific area need not be designated as vital in that 
operational state.  In such a case, the facility could choose to remove that area from the vital area set on a temporary 
basis.  In such case, it would be necessary to carefully search the area for sabotage devices and verify the operability 
of vital equipment as a part of returning the area to its vital area status before changing the facility operational state 
to one that required the area to be vital. 
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b. Environmental conditions in the area where the actions must be performed allow 
access of personnel. 
c. Adversary interference with the completion of the actions is precluded. 
d. Any equipment needed to complete the actions is available and ready for use.  
(This may require that the equipment is secured in a vital area.) 
e. Approved procedures for the actions exist. 
f. Training is conducted on the procedures covering the actions under conditions 
similar to the scenarios for which the actions are credited. 
6. Spurious actuation of equipment (as might occur as a result of fire) must be addressed. 
7. The effects of cyber attacks on equipment performance must be addressed. 
8. The inability of an adversary to identify cable trays containing power or control cables 
should not be used as a criterion to remove the cable trays from the vital area identifica-
tion process if cutting the cables would disable the equipment to which the cables are 
connected.   
9. Loss of coolant incidents and main steam line breaks must be considered credible adver-
sary acts unless access to all locations from which such acts could be performed are inac-
cessible because of disabling radiation levels or environmental conditions so severe that 
an attacker would not be able to carry out the required acts before being incapacitated. 
10. Assume that loss of offsite power occurs concurrent with an attack.   
11. Assume that all equipment outside the protected area of the plant is lost unless continued 
operation of the equipment makes the situation worse. 
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3. VITAL AREA IDENTIFICATION PROCESS 
Vital Area Identification (VAI) is the process of identifying the areas of a nuclear facility that 
must be protected to prevent malicious acts that could directly or indirectly endanger the public 
health and safety by exposure to radiation.  Exposure of the public to unacceptable levels of ra-
diation can occur only if radioactive material is dispersed from the facility.  In order to disperse 
the material by sabotage, an adversary must cause some form of dispersal energy to be applied to 
the radioactive material.  The adversary may do this directly by applying energy from an external 
source (such as explosives or incendiary devices) or indirectly by using the thermal or mechani-
cal energy stored in the material or its related process systems to cause dispersal.  Direct sabo-
tage attacks generally require the attacker to gain physical access to the area in which the mate-
rial is used or stored.  Indirect sabotage attacks may be possible without gaining direct access to 
the material, such as through attacks on cooling or other process or safety systems.   
VAI involves the use of logic models to systematically identify all of the malicious acts or com-
binations of malicious acts that could lead to radiological sabotage.  The models available in the 
plant probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and other safety analyses provide a great deal of the 
information and basic model structure needed for the sabotage logic model.  The probabilities of 
occurrence of events used in the PRA are not considered in the VAI process; only the PRA logic 
models are of use.  Also, as discussed in a later section of this document, there are events that are 
not generally considered in a PRA that could be caused by an adversary (for example, malicious 
acts that disable or destroy systems, structures, or components (SSC) not susceptible to random 
failure), and care must be taken to include those types of events in the sabotage logic model.   
The purpose of VAI is to identify the areas of the plant that must be protected against sabotage.  
Consequently, once the sabotage logic model is developed, the events (or malicious acts) in the 
model are replaced with the areas in which the events can be accomplished.  This sabotage area 
logic model is then analyzed to identify the target sets (combinations of areas the adversary must 
visit to cause radiological sabotage) and the candidate vital area sets (combinations of areas that 
must be protected against adversary access to prevent radiological sabotage).  Any one of the 
candidate vital area sets can be selected for protection.  Appropriate selection criteria will allow 
the licensee to minimize the impacts of vital area protection measures on plant safety, cost, op-
erations, or other factors of concern. 
The steps in the VAI process are as follows: 
1. Identify the inventories of radioactive material for which radiological sabotage is a con-
cern.  Include sabotage of these inventories as events in the sabotage logic model. 
2. Determine whether direct dispersal of each inventory of concern is possible; if so, in-
clude direct dispersal of the each such inventory as an event in the sabotage logic model.  
3. Identify any initiating events (IE) [Ref. 12] that can, alone or in combination with other 
malicious acts, lead indirectly to radiological sabotage of each inventory of concern.  
Identify the systems required to mitigate those IEs (if mitigation is possible) and the suc-
cess criteria for those mitigating systems. 
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4. Using the information obtained in step 3, develop the portions of the sabotage logic 
model that represent the combinations of events that could lead indirectly to radiological 
sabotage. 
5. Eliminate from the sabotage logic model any events that the design basis threat (DBT) 
does not have the capability to perform. 
6. Identify the areas corresponding to sabotage logic model events; that is, areas in which 
direct dispersal, IEs, and the mitigating system disablement events in the sabotage logic 
model can be accomplished.  Replace the events in the sabotage logic model with their 
corresponding areas. 
7. Solve the sabotage area logic model to identify the target sets – the combinations of areas 
to which the adversary must gain access in order to cause radiological sabotage. [Ref. 13, 
14, 16] 
8. Find the prevention sets of the sabotage area logic model (or find the Boolean comple-
ment of the result of step 7) to identify the candidate vital area sets – the combinations of 
areas that must be protected to prevent radiological sabotage. [Ref. 16, 18]   
9. Select the VA set that will be protected to prevent radiological sabotage. 
 
Each of these steps is discussed in detail in the sections that follow. 
3.1 Identify Inventories of Radioactive Material 
The first step in the VAI process is to identify all of the inventories of radioactive material at the 
facility that could be subject to radiological sabotage.  For nuclear power reactors, the core and 
the spent fuel pool are the primary focus of concern for radiological sabotage.  If there are any 
other significant inventories of material the release of which might exceed 10 CFR Part 100 lim-
its, they should be identified and addressed in the steps that follow.   
 
3.2 Assess Possibility of Direct Dispersal  
The licensee should determine whether it is possible for an adversary to cause direct dispersal of 
each inventory of concern.  This will depend upon the capabilities and resources of the DBT, the 
structural characteristics of the plant, the environmental conditions in the area where the inven-
tory is located, and perhaps other factors.  Because of the massive structures surrounding the 
core and the spent fuel pool (and the extreme environmental conditions in locations from which 
the core might be directly attacked), it is unlikely that either of these inventories could be di-
rectly dispersed.  However, if direct dispersal of one or both of these inventories is deemed pos-
sible, the direct dispersal of the appropriate inventory should be included as an event in the sabo-
tage logic model.  For any other inventories of concern, the licensee should perform a conserva-
tive analysis to determine whether the complete release of the inventory of radioactive material 
could exceed 10 CFR Part 100 limits.  A conservative analysis considers that 100% of the inven-
tory converts into respirable-sized particles during a direct attack.  The analysis should be per-
formed without consideration of physical protection or mitigation measures present at the facil-
ity.  If the potential radiological consequences calculated for an inventory under these conserva-
tive analysis conditions are below Part 100 levels, the identification of vital areas need not be 
considered for this inventory.  Such inventories may be protected in accordance with prudent 
management practice.  If the release of a complete inventory could exceed the Part 100 limits, 
the possibility of direct dispersal of the inventory must be considered.  The direct dispersal of the 
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inventory should be included in the sabotage logic model as a potential malicious act leading di-
rectly to unacceptable consequences, and the remaining steps of the vital area identification proc-
ess should be performed for the inventory. The feasibility that the threat could cause direct dis-
persal of the inventory is addressed when the threat characteristics are considered later in the 
process. 
 
3.3 Assess Possibility of Indirect Dispersal 
Malicious acts that lead indirectly to release are ones that use the potential energy (i.e., heat or 
pressure) contained in the nuclear or radioactive material or in a process system to disperse the 
material.  Indirect sabotage attacks do not require that the adversary gain access to the area in 
which the material is located; instead, they involve attacks against SSC or operator actions that 
normally maintain the facility in a safe state.  To determine the areas that must be protected to 
prevent acts that lead indirectly to radiological sabotage, two types of sabotage attacks must be 
considered, namely those in which the adversary:  
• causes an IE that creates conditions more severe than the facility mitigating systems 
can accommodate (that is, events that are beyond the safety design basis); or  
• causes an IE and disables the systems needed to mitigate the effects of the IE. 
 
An IE that is deliberately caused by an adversary in an attempt to cause a radioactive release 
from a facility is called an initiating event of malicious origin (IEMO).  
3.3.1 Identify IEMOs 
Many of the IEs that can lead to release of radioactive material will have already been identified 
and analyzed in the plant PRA or other safety analyses.  However, there are two classes of 
IEMOs that are probably not addressed in the plant PRA.  The first class of IEMOs that may not 
have been analyzed in the safety analyses includes those IEs that are so unlikely to occur ran-
domly that they may have been identified but excluded from consideration.  Such events typi-
cally include massive breaches or failures of passive components that, while extremely improb-
able as random events, can be accomplished by an adversary equipped with explosives or other 
tools (depending on the specifics of the DBT being applied).  The second class of IEMOs in-
cludes those involving sources of radioactive material releases that may not have been within the 
scope of the plant PRA.  For example, Level 1 PRAs at nuclear power reactors address only 
events with the potential to lead to core damage and, thereby, the release of radioactive material 
from the reactor core.  Other inventories of radioactive material that might be the source of re-
lease leading to radiological sabotage also should be considered in the VAI.  There are four ap-
proaches that can be used to identify IEMOs.  Because the objective is to produce a list that is as 
complete as possible, all of the approaches listed below should be followed, although one may be 
selected as the main approach. 
1. Review of risk assessment documentation.  This should be the starting point for this part 
of the VAI.  Lists of IEs in the full-power PRA, in the fire PRA (or other fire analyses), 
in the seismic PRA (or other seismic analyses), and any other safety evaluation for the 
plant being analyzed and for similar facilities should be reviewed.  Because any of the 
IEs that can occur randomly can also be caused by malicious acts, this set of IEs should 
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be included in the list of IEMOs.  Note that the assumptions in risk (or safety) assess-
ments regarding the nature of these IEs and the plant response to them should be reexam-
ined in the context of possible malicious acts and revised where appropriate. 
2. Reference to other VAIs.  Where other VAI analyses for similar facilities are available, 
the IEMOs identified in those analyses should be reviewed.  It is particularly important to 
identify any IEMOs that were not considered in plant PRA (or safety) documentation. 
3. Engineering evaluation.  The plant systems (operational and safety) and major compo-
nents should be systematically reviewed to see whether any malicious acts (e.g., dis-
abling, causing to operate spuriously, breaching, disrupting, collapsing, or igniting) could 
lead directly, or in combination with other malicious acts, to radiological sabotage.  This 
approach should generally not be selected as the main approach for VAI.  If the risk as-
sessment (and safety) documentation is adequate, engineering evaluations should be lim-
ited to circumstances where they will provide a definite benefit, including consideration 
and analysis of classes of possible malicious acts that are not addressed in risk or safety 
analysis documentation. 
4. Deductive analysis.  In this approach, the VAI analyst should attempt to identify all 
IEMOs that could lead to radiological release without regard to the operation of mitigat-
ing systems and other preventive actions.  The safety functions that must be performed to 
maintain each inventory of concern in a safe state, the systems that perform those safety 
functions, and the malicious acts that would lead to failure of those systems should be 
identified.  The malicious acts that lead to failure of the systems are then candidates for 
the list of IEMOs for the plant.  This approach should generally not be selected as the 
main approach for VAI.  The main benefit of this approach for facilities with adequate 
risk assessment (and safety) documentation is brainstorming to identify classes of possi-
ble malicious acts that are not addressed in risk or safety analyses. 
Care should be taken to include IEMOs that may be accomplished from outside the plant.  De-
pending upon the adversary capabilities (as defined in the applicable DBT that may include in-
sider actions), IEMOs of this type can range from attacks on electrical transmission components 
that isolate the plant from the electrical grid (loss of offsite power) to attacks on plant SSC (e.g., 
storage tanks or transformers) and operator actions that can be completed from offsite.  Events in 
this classification will need to be treated differently from those that require an adversary to ac-
cess areas within the plant.4   
Care should also be taken to include IEMOs for each of the plant operational states that the VAI 
needs to address, as identified in Section 2.  IEMOs should be cross-referenced to the plant op-
erational state(s) for which they are applicable. 
The list of IEMOs should be reviewed to remove any repetitions or overlaps and checked further 
for inadvertent omissions.  Once identified, the IEMOs are normally listed in a systematic way.  
A simple example for a light water reactor might be: 
                                                 
4 This different treatment is required because these IEMOs cannot be protected against by designating the areas from 
which they can be caused as vital areas.  Therefore, they are treated in a different manner where the events are 
linked to locations as described in a later section.   
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1. Loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) break sizes (beyond design basis, large, small); 
2. Interfacing system LOCAs, and other LOCAs that affect mitigating systems; 
3. Transients applicable to the plant; 
4. Transients initiated by disabling support systems in ways that affect mitigating systems; 
5. Combinations of the above (e.g., LOCAs with loss of offsite power); and 
6. Malicious acts directed against other radioactive material inventories, such as the spent 
fuel pool. 
The list of IEMOs should be prepared in suitable format and retained as part of the VAI docu-
ment of  record. 
Each IEMO should be assessed to determine whether there are systems capable of mitigating it.  
Every IEMO that exceeds mitigating system capacity should be included in the sabotage logic 
model as a potential malicious act leading to radiological sabotage. The feasibility that the threat 
could cause an IEMO that exceeds mitigating system capacity is addressed when the threat char-
acteristics are considered later in the process.  The steps described in the next two sections 
should be performed for IEMOs that can be mitigated.  
3.3.2  Identify Mitigating Systems 
This part of VAI answers the question, “For IEMOs that can be mitigated, what mitigating sys-
tems (including operator actions) must an adversary disable concurrent with the IEMOs to cause 
radiological sabotage?”  For each IEMO, the safety functions that must be performed in order to 
prevent radiological sabotage should be identified.  Note that the safety functions that need to be 
performed in response to a specific IEMO may vary depending upon the plant operating state.  
The concept of safety functions is discussed in References 12, 13, and 14.  The safety functions 
for light water reactors that are important for protecting against significant core damage and 
spent fuel sabotage are listed below.5   
1. Control core reactivity; 
2. Remove core decay heat and stored heat; 
3. Maintain integrity of primary reactor coolant boundary (pressure control); 
4. Maintain primary coolant inventory; 
5. Remove irradiated fuel decay heat; and 
6. Maintain integrity of irradiated fuel storage. 
                                                 
5 This list does not include maintenance of subcriticality of irradiated fuel based upon the implicit conclusion that a 
criticality event in the irradiated fuel storage area would not cause exposures in excess of 10 CFR100 limits.   
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The safety functions required to maintain the core and spent fuel pool within prescribed and ac-
ceptable operating limits are typically described in safety analysis reports.  The PRA will iden-
tify the plant safety functions and the safety and, in some cases, non-safety systems that can be 
employed to perform them. 
The next stage of the analysis is to identify the systems that are directly or indirectly required for 
the performance of each safety function.  Here again, the specific systems that perform a particu-
lar safety function may differ depending upon the plant operating state.  The systems that directly 
perform a safety function are defined to be front line systems and those required for proper func-
tioning of the front line systems are defined to be support systems.  Table  shows safety functions 
and the corresponding front line systems for a typical pressurized water reactor. 
 
Table 3-1.  Pressurized Water Reactor Safety Functions and Corresponding Front 
Line Systems 
Safety Function  Front Line System 
Control reactivity  (a) Reactor protection system 
(b) High pressure injection system 
 
Remove core decay heat and stored heat  (a) Power conversion system 
(b) Emergency feedwater system 
(c) High pressure injection system and pressurizer 
relief valves (feed and bleed) 
(d) Low pressure injection system 
(e) Residual heat removal system 
 
Maintain integrity of primary reactor coolant 
boundary (pressure control) 
 
 Pressurizer safety relief valves 
Maintain primary coolant inventory  (a) High pressure injection system 
(b) Low pressure injection system 
 
Protect containment integrity  
(isolation, overpressure) 
 (a) Containment spray system 
(b) Containment cooling system 
 
Scrub radioactive materials from containment at-
mosphere 
 (a) Containment spray system 
(b) Containment ventilation system 
 
Remove irradiated fuel decay heat  Spent fuel pool cooling system 
 
Maintain integrity of irradiated fuel storage  Spent fuel pool 
 
Maintain integrity of radioactive waste storage  (a) Gaseous waste processing system 
(b) Liquid waste processing system 
(c) Solid waste processing system 
 
The set of front line systems that perform each safety function alone or in combination with other 
systems should be identified and catalogued (see Table ).  As discussed above, much of this in-
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formation can be obtained from the plant-specific PRA.  Other information, if needed, may be 
obtained from various safety analysis reports.   
The VAI analyst should prepare a dependency table or spreadsheet linking front line systems 
with the support systems and operator actions that successful performance of the front line sys-
tems depend upon.  The initial dependency table/spreadsheet is then used to produce a list of 
support systems.  The analyst identifies all systems required for the functioning of these support 
systems.  These additional support systems are added to the list of support systems.  This process 
is repeated until all systems that affect the operation of the front line systems through this chain 
of dependencies have been identified and their dependencies documented.  The analyst also 
makes a dependency table/spreadsheet illustrating the dependencies among these support sys-
tems.  A majority of this information should be readily available from the plant-specific PRA or 
supporting documentation. 
These dependencies relate to the direct hardware and functional dependencies.  There may be 
other dependencies that relate to specific malicious acts or sabotage scenarios. For example, ex-
plosive breaching of a cooling water pipe may cause flooding that disables equipment near the 
pipe breach.  Such location dependencies will be analyzed later in the VAI process and should 
not be included in the dependency tables/spreadsheets developed in this activity. 
The final results of this activity are: 
1. A list of the safety functions needed to respond to each IEMO and a table/spreadsheet of 
safety functions and combinations of front line systems that can perform each function; 
2. A list of front line systems; 
3. A list of support systems (all inclusive); 
4. A dependency table/spreadsheet among front line systems,  support systems, and operator 
actions; 
5. A table/spreadsheet for dependencies among support systems and operator actions. 
This information should be recorded in the appropriate standard record format and retained as 
part of the VAI document of record.  The systems identified in this activity are modeled in the 
plant sabotage fault tree. 
 
3.3.3 Determining Mitigating System Success Criteria 
The required performance of a front line system depends, in general, on the IEMO.  Required 
performance of a front line system means the minimum performance needed for the successful 
fulfillment of the system’s safety function under the specific conditions created by the IEMO.  
These success criteria for front line systems are of particular importance for the VAI analysis 
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because they define the top events or starting points for the subsequent development of the plant 
sabotage fault tree branches6 (see Section 3.4.2). 
Success criteria can be defined unambiguously for front line systems for which clear success or 
failure in the performance of a safety function can be recognized.  In addition to a performance 
definition (e.g., flow rate, response time, trip limits), the success criteria must be expressed in 
hardware terms, such as the number of required flow paths, power trains, etc. 
Defining success criteria for support systems may be more complex. In most cases support sys-
tems serve more than one front line system, and consequently each possible state of the system 
(e.g., three trains operating, two trains operating, one train operating, or no train operating) has a 
different effect on the front line systems that perform a certain function.  A particular support 
system state could therefore lead to a safety function success or failure depending on the particu-
lar state of the front line system that it is supporting.  
Relevant information for developing front line system and support system success criteria is 
given in the plant safety analyses.  The plant-specific PRA generally provides realistic success 
criteria.  The bases for all success criteria should be clearly referenced in the documentation and 
should be included in the documentation if the references are not accessible.   
This analysis produces a table/spreadsheet that lists the associated front line systems and support 
systems for each IEMO, as identified earlier; their success criteria for that IEMO; references to 
supporting documentation; and any special characteristics of that IEMO that affect the success 
criteria.  The PRA documentation should provide this information for the IEMOs for which cor-
responding safety IEs were analyzed.  The table/spreadsheet should be documented in the appro-
priate standard record format and retained as part of the VAI document of record in the licensee 
or applicant document system. 
3.3.4 Grouping of IEMOs 
Once the system success criteria have been established, the IEMOs can be grouped so that all 
IEMOs in the same group require that front line systems and support systems meet essentially 
the same success criteria to prevent radiological sabotage and cause the same special conditions.  
Thus, the same sabotage fault tree branch can model sabotage scenarios beginning with any of 
the IEMOs in a group.  Through the process of grouping, it will be clear that some categories of 
IEMOs need to be subdivided.  For example, LOCAs may need to be divided by break size.  An 
example LOCA grouping is provided in Table 3-2.  Other categories of IEMOs may require 
similar division.  The plant-specific PRA documentation should contain the grouping of safety 
IEs, which can be employed for the IEMOs that correspond to safety IEs.  Relatively few IEMOs 
do not correspond to safety IEs, and those generally must be categorized in separate groups.   
The IEMO that is used to represent the group in the subsequent sabotage fault tree development 
(typically the IEMO in the group that places the most stringent demands on safety systems), is 
defined to be the bounding IEMO.  The remaining IEMOs in the group are defined to be the 
                                                 
6 Because the adversary wants to disable the system, these top events are defined in a negative sense; that is, failure 
of the system to meet the success criteria.  
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bounded IEMOs.  Examples of IE grouping for various reactor types can be found in Reference 
15. 
Table 3-2.  Example LOCA Size Grouping 
Initiating Event 
Name 
LOCA Size Front Line Systems Success Criteria 
Small LOCA Up to 2 inches High Pressure Injection System 1 of 3 Pumps 
Medium LOCA 2 to 8 inches 
High Pressure Injection System 
Accumulators 
1 of 3 Pumps 
2 of 3 Accumulators 
Large LOCA > 8 inches 
Low Pressure Injection System 
Accumulators 
1 of 2 Pumps 
2 of 3 Accumulators 
 
The result of this activity is the development of a set of bounding IEMOs and associated system 
success criteria that can be used for developing the plant sabotage fault tree.  The VAI documen-
tation should record the IEMOs that are “bounded” by the IEMOs used in the sabotage fault tree 
development.  This documentation is needed to verify completeness and to ensure that when the 
bounding IEMOs are linked to locations, the location set includes those locations from which the 
adversary can accomplish the bounded IEMOs as well as those from which the bounding IEMO 
can be accomplished.  The documentation developed should be retained as part of the VAI 
document of record.  
3.4 Develop Sabotage Logic Model 
The next step in performing VAI analyses is constructing a logic model that represents the set of 
possible sabotage scenarios for the plant that could lead to radiological sabotage.  Direct disper-
sal events and IEMOs that exceed mitigating system capacity should be included in the logic 
model as noted in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.  Other sabotage scenarios that lead indirectly to radio-
logical sabotage consist of a bounding IEMO combined with malicious acts required to disable 
specific systems needed to mitigate that IEMO.   
The sabotage logic model is developed from information provided in the plant-specific PRA (and 
other safety) documentation.  Typically, this is accomplished in two stages.  The first stage is 
developing the top-level sabotage logic model to record each type of sabotage attack that is of 
concern.  The second stage is developing the system sabotage logic models, the branches for in-
dividual front line systems and the support systems they are dependent upon.  This activity is 
performed by modifying existing PRA models.  Because PRAs use fault trees to describe system 
failures, the remainder of this document assumes that the sabotage logic model will be a fault 
tree.  The details of sabotage fault tree development are presented in the following section. 
 23
3.4.1 Top-Level Sabotage Fault Tree Development 
The top-level sabotage fault tree aggregates the set of sabotage scenarios that could cause radio-
logical sabotage.  Although all operating states of concern could be addressed in a single fault 
tree, the following discussion assumes that a separate tree will be developed for each operating 
state.  The top event (first level) in the plant sabotage fault tree is “Nuclear Power Plant Radio-
logical Sabotage.”  The second level of the plant sabotage fault tree identifies the radioactive ma-
terial inventories of concern for the plant, the reactor core, the spent fuel pool, and any other in-
ventories of concern. These events are linked by an OR gate, because an adversary could cause 
radiological sabotage by attacking any of these inventories.   
The third level of the plant sabotage fault tree identifies the types of attacks (direct or indirect) 
appropriate for each inventory.  Once again, the events are linked by an OR gate, because an ad-
versary could cause radiological sabotage by any of the means deemed plausible.  Figure 3-1 
shows an example of the top three levels of the sabotage fault tree for a nuclear power plant.  The 
symbols with concave bottoms are OR gates, and the triangles are transfer symbols, indicating 
that there is additional development of the event in other branches of the tree.  The remainder of 
this section discusses the development of the sabotage fault tree for significant core damage.  
The development of fault tree branches for the other inventories of concern should follow the 
same approach. 
For each IEMO that can be mitigated, the fault tree should connect the bounding IEMO with dis-
ablement of the associated front line systems identified in Section 3.3.4.  An example would be 
“Small Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with Mitigating Systems Disabled.”  The events at 
this level are linked by an OR gate because an adversary could cause radiological sabotage em-
ploying any of these sabotage scenarios.  These events are further developed based upon the suc-
cess criteria developed in Section 3.3.3.  The technique for the further development of these 
events uses event tree models from the plant-specific PRA as discussed below.  The general 
techniques for constructing and manipulating fault trees are described in Reference 16.  
The PRA event trees illustrate the combinations of safety IEs and front line system failures that 
cause specific plant damage states.7  This information is used in developing portions of the plant 
sabotage fault tree in the following three steps: 
1. For each bounding IEMO that has a corresponding safety IE, review the event tree that illus-
trates the plant response to the IE. 
2. Simplify the event tree by removing branching events where both branches lead to core dam-
age.  See Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3 for an example.  The IE is shown at the left side of the 
event tree (Large LOCA in this case), and the mitigating systems for the IE are listed along 
the top.  The branches indicate whether the system functions properly (the Yes branch) or 
fails (the No branch).  Figure 3-3 shows the event tree in Figure 3-2 with the branching event 
“Containment Integrity” removed since both branches for this event lead to core damage.  
Containment integrity is irrelevant to the identification of vital areas, because radiological 
sabotage is achieved once core damage occurs. 
                                                 
7 For a discussion of event trees and their use in PRA, see Reference 13 and 14. 
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3. Once the event trees have been simplified, convert them into fault tree branches by linking 
together the various event tree branches leading to radiological sabotage with an OR gate and 
then linking the events along each of the branches with an AND gate.  Figure 3-4 illustrates 
the fault tree branch constructed from the simplified event tree in Figure 3-3.  The symbols 
with flat bottoms are AND gates, indicating that all the inputs must be present in order for the 
event to occur.  The circles indicate basic events for which no further development is needed. 
If the event tree contains branches that do not correspond to on-site equipment failures (e.g., op-
erator recovery actions, human errors, or restoration of off-site power), determine which branch 
of the event tree is appropriate for sabotage modeling.  Then, trim out the inappropriate branch 
and all branches coming off of it before developing the corresponding sabotage fault tree 
branches.8  For example, if the event tree includes recovery of offsite power within a specific 
time period, the VAI analyst should determine, based upon the DBT characteristics and plant 
contingency measures, whether credit can be taken for the recovery of off-site power.  If so, then 
the event tree branch where off-site power is not recovered should be ignored when developing 
the sabotage fault tree branch.  Similar considerations apply to operator recovery actions.  The 
determination of whether credit can be taken for operator recovery actions should be based upon 
conditions specified in Section 2. 
 
 
Figure 3-1. Example of Top Three Levels of a Nuclear Power Plant Sabotage Fault Tree. 
                                                 
8 These probabilistic events must be resolved into a deterministic sabotage scenario.  Therefore, the VAI analyst 
should determine whether they will be credited as occurring during the sabotage scenario. 
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Figure 3-4. Equivalent Sabotage Fault Tree Branch 
 
The plant sabotage fault tree has “Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Sabotage” as its top event 
and the bounding IEMOs and front line systems that must be disabled to cause significant core 
damage as its lowest level events.  Section 3.4.2 discusses the development of the sabotage fault 
tree branches for each front line system and the support systems upon which the front line sys-
tems depend.   
3.4.2 System Sabotage Fault Tree Branches 
The next step in the VAI analysis is the construction of sabotage fault tree branches for each of 
the front line systems in the plant sabotage fault tree and for each of the support systems with 
which they have dependencies.  These sabotage fault tree branches are similar to the correspond-
ing fault trees used in PRAs.  However, there are some differences because sabotage fault tree 
branches are designed to model sabotage scenarios while PRA fault trees model system failure 
logic.  These differences between modeling sabotage scenarios and system failure logic affect the 
construction of the sabotage fault tree branches in the following manner: 
1. System sabotage fault tree branches should comprehensively identify the locations from 
which items can be disabled, but need not reflect all item failure modes or all mechanisms for 
disabling the item. 
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2. System sabotage fault tree branches should include any sabotage events that are so unlikely 
to occur randomly that they were not considered in the PRA, such as destruction of robust 
passive components. 
 
3. Operator recovery actions and other events in PRA system fault trees that affect system 
availability but do not correspond to malicious acts in a sabotage scenario must be treated in 
a special manner.  This type of event is treated as either occurring or as never occurring dur-
ing or in response to a malicious act.  Thus, operator actions that meet the conditions speci-
fied in Section 2 are treated as always occurring; those that don’t meet the conditions are 
treated as never occurring in the sabotage fault tree. 
 
The implications of these three differences are discussed in the contexts both of developing sys-
tem sabotage fault tree branches and of modifying PRA fault trees to develop system sabotage 
fault tree branches. 
3.4.2.1 Location Focus 
The VAI sabotage fault tree branches are designed to identify the locations (areas) from which 
an adversary can disable systems.  Therefore, it is extremely important that the basic events in 
the sabotage fault tree branch be sufficiently comprehensive that the location linkages developed 
in Section 3.6 reflect all locations and combinations of locations where an adversary could dis-
able the system.  On the other hand, there is no need for the system sabotage fault tree branch 
basic events to reflect all of the ways in which the system can be disabled from a single location.  
Therefore, the sabotage fault tree model is typically developed to the point where a piece of 
equipment, a component, or a device is disabled, but no further, so that the fault tree does not 
specify the means by which the item is disabled.  However, when there are means of disabling an 
item from remote locations, the fault tree should be developed to show all of these remote means 
of disabling the item.  Examples of means of sabotaging components from a remote location in-
clude disabling a valve from the associated motor control center, disabling a pump motor by cut-
ting its control or power cables, or disabling or improperly positioning a component by a remote 
cyber attack.  These methods of disabling components should be shown in the system sabotage 
fault tree branches.   
Therefore, PRA system fault trees can be simplified to develop system sabotage fault tree 
branches by combining multiple failure modes of a single component, such as “Component Fails 
to Start” and “Component Fails to Run,” into a single event, e.g., “Component Disabled.”  This 
single event should then be developed to show the areas from which the component can be dis-
abled.  Figure 3-5 gives an example of the way that the sabotage fault tree branch for disabling a 
motor-driven pump is developed.  (Note that this branch includes only the pump and does not 
include piping.)  Likewise, events in a single area, such as manipulation of manual valves or 
check valves located in the same area as a pump, can be combined into a single event, such as 
“Pump Disabled Locally.” 
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Figure 3-5. Fault Tree Branch for Disabling a Motor-Driven Pump 
 
3.4.2.2 Low Probability Events 
The fault trees in PRAs are simplified by not including component failures of such low probabil-
ity that they do not contribute to risk.  However, an adversary may be able to intentionally cause 
such failures as a means of disabling a system.  Failures of this type include spontaneous catas-
trophic failures of passive components.  Thus it is necessary to add such malicious acts as dis-
abling a system by breaching piping, breaching tanks or reservoirs, and cutting cables.  For 
events in fluid systems where piping is breached, it is also necessary to consider situations in 
which the breach creates an alternate flow path that seriously degrades or disables the system.  In 
addition, fluid from pipe breaches or tank ruptures may cause local flooding that disables or de-
grades the performance of nearby equipment.   
Two additional events involving valve position are frequently not considered in PRAs because of 
their very low probability of occurrence:  (1) spurious control faults after initial operation where 
the component is not expected to receive an additional signal during the course of the accident to 
readjust or change its operating state; and (2) position faults before an accident if the component 
receives an automatic signal to return to its operable state under accident conditions.  However, 
an adversary could create a spurious control fault to disable a component from, for example, a 
motor control center.  Likewise, a saboteur at a motor control center or the valve itself could in-
duce a position fault before causing the IEMO and disable cabling to ensure that the valve never 
receives the automatic signal to return to its operable state when required to do so.  Possible ma-
licious acts of this type should be addressed in the system sabotage fault tree branches.9 
                                                 
9 These types of failures (faults) may be included in the plant fire PRA. 
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3.4.2.3 Non Equipment Fault Events Affecting System Availability 
The system fault trees developed for PRAs frequently include events that do not involve equip-
ment, component, or device faults, but affect system reliability or availability.  Non-fault events 
of this type include operator recovery actions, test and maintenance outages, and human errors.  
Fault tree events that involve equipment, component, or device faults generally translate quite 
directly into sabotage scenario events.  However, non-fault events do not translate directly into 
sabotage scenario events.  Test and maintenance outage and human error events should be de-
leted from PRA fault trees when they are translated into system sabotage fault tree branches.  As 
discussed in Section 2, it is not necessary to assume that maintenance outages or random failure 
events occur simultaneously with an attack when developing the sabotage fault tree. 10    Operator 
actions can be included in the sabotage logic model if they satisfy the conditions listed in Section 
2 under which credit can be taken for operator actions.  An operator action event included in the 
sabotage fault tree might be named “Adversary Prevents Completion of Operator Action X.”   
3.4.3 Sabotage Fault Tree Development Results 
The process described above produces a sabotage fault tree that describes the combinations of 
malicious acts that can lead to radiological sabotage.  This sabotage fault tree will have the 
IEMOs and disablement of systems, personnel, and equipment as basic events.  The fault tree 
and related supporting information should be documented and retained as part of the VAI docu-
ment of record. 
3.5 Assess DBT Capability to Perform Sabotage Acts 
The sabotage events addressed in the preceding sections do not consider the capability of the 
threat to perform the malicious acts.  Indeed, all events that could lead directly or indirectly to 
radiological sabotage are included to ensure that no potential vital areas are overlooked without 
regard to whether the DBT capabilities are sufficient to perform the sabotage acts.  If the DBT 
characteristics change, the information and models developed in the preceding steps will be valid 
for use in identifying vital areas under the changed threat conditions. 
In this step of the process, any events that are not credible given the DBT capabilities should be 
eliminated from consideration.  The DBT capability to perform the direct dispersal of material, to 
cause IEMOs, and to disable mitigating systems should be assessed.  Events that are beyond the 
capability of the threat may be removed from the sabotage logic model.  The rationale for re-
moval of events and any associated analyses should be documented and retained as part of the 
VAI document of record. 
In addition, any events that are beyond the ability of the facility physical protection system to 
prevent should be identified.  In the analysis of the sabotage logic model, any such events will be 
assumed to occur always.  Generally, any events that the threat can accomplish without gaining 
access to the site should be assumed to occur.  The VAI process should assume that offsite power 
is unavailable at the time that optimizes the possibility of adversary attack success.  Any other 
                                                 
10 As noted in Section 2, vital equipment maintenance outages during operations should be addressed as specified in 
Reference 10, Volume 3 and may require the implementation of compensatory measures. 
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such events in the sabotage logic model should be identified and highlighted for proper treatment 
in the area identification process described in Section 3.6. 
3.6 Identify Areas for Malicious Acts 
The next step in the VAI analysis process is identifying and documenting the locations from 
which an adversary could accomplish each of the events in the sabotage fault tree.  This step an-
swers the question, “To what plant areas must the adversary gain access to in order to cause ra-
diological sabotage?”  Once the location information has been collected, it is entered into the 
plant sabotage fault tree as discussed in Section 3.6.4.  The resulting sabotage area fault tree can 
then be solved to determine the combinations of locations from which malicious acts could cause 
radiological sabotage. 
3.6.1 Area Designations 
The first step in collecting location data is to subdivide the plant into areas.  Because some or all 
of these areas may be designated as vital areas, it must be practicable to provide them with the 
protection specified for vital areas in 10 CFR 73.55.  Therefore, it must be feasible to use exist-
ing structures or implement new construction to establish a physical barrier around each defined 
area.  It must also be feasible to control access to each area and to alarm and secure appropriately 
all points of access to the area.   
The VAI analyst should consult with the organization responsible for physical protection system 
design when defining areas for VAI.  Generally, it is more efficient to subdivide the plant into 
areas that are as small as could be feasibly designated as vital areas.  Once the location data has 
been collected, it is possible to aggregate two or more locations into a larger area without collect-
ing additional data.  However, it is necessary to conduct additional review to split a larger area 
into two or more smaller areas.   
Once area divisions are established, they should be documented by marking them on plant eleva-
tion drawings or other plant design and layout documents to define clearly the area boundaries.  
Each area should be assigned a name and assigned an abbreviation that could be used as an event 
name in the computer software employed for fault tree analysis.  To reduce errors in collecting 
location data, the area names should be as consistent with the names in common use at the plant 
as practicable.   
3.6.2 Data Collection 
The VAI analyst should consult with plant design and operations staff to determine the plant ar-
eas to which the adversary would have to gain access in order to cause each IEMO and each dis-
ablement event in the sabotage fault tree.   This data collection may require support from several 
technical disciplines, such as plant mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation and control engi-
neering organizations.     Studies such as safe shutdown analyses and fire and seismic PRAs may 
provide good sources of data on equipment locations to support the data collection.   
The VAI analyst should look for ways that malicious acts in other nearby areas could accomplish 
the disablement events. Examples of events that could couple multiple areas include drainage 
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paths from other areas where fluid line or tank breaches could flood the area, and airflow paths 
from which smoke, steam, or other environmental contaminants could enter the area.  Fire paths 
and combustible loading that might permit a fire to spread into the area if fire protec-
tion/suppression systems were disabled should also be considered.  Another way that malicious 
acts could disable items in nearby areas would be to destroy related supports and structures that 
could directly cause items to fail or cause debris to strike the items, thereby disabling them.   
In addition to identifying the plant areas in which malicious acts can be performed the VAI ana-
lyst should identify and document any IEMOs or disablement actions that can be accomplished 
by an adversary from outside the plant boundary.   
3.6.3 Data Preparation 
The data collected in the previous section should be organized into a table or spreadsheet that 
lists the area(s) from which for each basic event in the sabotage fault tree can be accomplished.  
Where the disabling of an item is the result of an event that affects multiple areas (e.g., arson 
with the fire suppression system disabled), this should be noted.  Likewise, the table should also 
include notes in the case that an area is linked to a bounding IEMO, not because the bounding 
IEMO can be accomplished from there but rather because a bounded IEMO can be accomplished 
from there.  
3.6.4 Incorporating Location Data in the Sabotage Fault Tree 
Incorporating location information into the plant sabotage fault tree links the IEMOs and the dis-
ablement acts represented in the sabotage fault tree, with the locations from which they can be 
accomplished.    This is accomplished in three slightly different ways depending upon the spe-
cific sabotage scenario being modeled.  The three approaches are discussed separately below. 
3.6.4.1 On-site IEMOs or Disablement Events 
For IEMOs or the disablement events that can be accomplished from one or more on-site loca-
tions the area data is included in the sabotage fault tree as follows:  
1. Change the basic event that represents the IEMO or disablement event into an OR gate. 
 
2. Add new basic event(s) under the OR gate that represent the area(s) from which the IEMO or 
disablement event can be accomplished.  The new location basic event(s) should be named in 
accordance with the abbreviation(s) established when the areas were defined.11 
Figure 3.6 illustrates this process for the malicious act of disabling control power to an emer-
gency diesel generator. 
 
                                                 
11 Some fault tree analysis or PRA computer programs may make it possible to link basic events with areas without 
making these modifications to the facility sabotage fault tree.  If these features are used, the linkage should be per-
formed in a manner that is clear and traceable.  
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Figure 3-6. Location Modeling Example for On-site Malicious Acts 
 
3.6.4.2 Off-site IEMO or Disablement Event 
IEMOs (e.g., isolating the facility from the electrical grid) or disablement events (e.g., breaching 
a water or fuel storage tank) that can be accomplished from offsite are modeled in the sabotage 
fault tree in the following manner: 
1. Convert the basic event corresponding to each of the IEMOs and disablement events to a 
House Event (also referred to as an External Event in Reference16).12 
 
2. Set the value of each of these events in the fault tree software to “True,” “Omega,” or what-
ever nomenclature represents an event that always occurs.  This models the obvious point 
that malicious acts that can be accomplished from offsite cannot be protected against by des-
ignating onsite areas as vital areas and providing protection for them. 
 
3.6.5 Results from Incorporating Location Data into the Sabotage Fault Tree 
The result of this task is a sabotage area fault tree that reflects the locations from which IEMOs 
can be accomplished and items can be disabled.  In this sabotage area fault tree: 
1. All bottom level events are either basic events or house events, and 
 
2. All basic events are area locations. 
The area designations, table of areas in which malicious acts can be performed, and sabotage 
area fault tree should be documented and retained as part of the VAI document of record. 
                                                 
12 This first step is specified only to enhance the clarity of the fault tree model and to permit quality assurance 
checks.  The basic event probabilities may also be modified without changing the event type. 
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3.7 Identify Target Sets 
The combinations of areas to which the adversary must gain access in order to cause radiological 
sabotage are the target sets for the plant.  The target set identification is done by solving the area 
sabotage fault tree to obtain its minimal cut sets.  This is typically accomplished by employing 
fault tree analysis software.  The software should be configured to obtain an untruncated qualita-
tive solution to the fault tree with no probability cut-off.  Each minimal cut set is a minimal set of 
areas from which an adversary could perform actions that would cause radiological sabotage.  
The target sets identified in this way can be used in planning evaluations of the physical protec-
tion system at the plant (such as tabletop exercises, force-on-force exercises, or nuclear power 
plant security assessments [Ref. 10, 17]).  In order to prevent malicious acts leading to radiologi-
cal sabotage, the plant must protect at least one area in each of these area combinations.  The tar-
get sets and related fault tree analysis results should be documented and retained as part of the 
VAI document of record. 
3.8 Identify Candidate Vital Area Sets 
The candidate vital area sets are the combinations of areas that must be protected to prevent ra-
diological sabotage.  Each candidate vital area set contains at least one area from each target set.  
If the adversary is denied access to all the areas in any one of the candidate vital area sets, then 
the adversary will not be able to complete any of the sabotage scenarios represented in the sabo-
tage fault tree.  Each of the candidate vital area sets contains a minimum complement of systems, 
personnel, and equipment that, if protected against malicious acts, will prevent radiological sabo-
tage. 
 
The candidate vital area sets are identified by constructing and solving the dual (or the Boolean 
complement) of the sabotage fault tree. [Ref. 16]  Most fault tree analysis computer programs 
have features that make it possible to take the Boolean complement of a fault tree.  If this feature 
is not available, the sabotage prevention tree can be derived directly from the sabotage area fault 
tree by complementing all events and interchanging OR and AND gates.  When solving the plant 
sabotage fault tree, the areas in the minimal cut sets mean that an adversary enters the area to 
commit a malicious act.  When solving the prevention fault tree, the complemented areas in the 
tree mean that an adversary is prevented from entering the areas.  Thus, the cut sets for the sabo-
tage prevention fault tree (or the prevention sets [Ref, 18] for the sabotage fault tree) are the sets 
of areas that contain the minimum complement of systems, personnel, and equipment to be pro-
tected against sabotage.  Thus any one of these prevention sets is a candidate to be selected as the 
set of vital areas for the plant.  As noted in Section 2, any areas containing inventories of unirra-
diated MOX fuel should also be included in the set of areas to be protected as vital areas.  Con-
sequently, any areas containing unirradiated MOX fuel should be added to every candidate vital 
area set.  The list of candidate vital area sets and the analysis used to identify them should be 
documented and retained as part of the VAI document of record.  
3.9 Select a Vital Area Set to Protect 
The final stage of the VAI analysis answers the question, “Which of the candidate vital area sets 
(i.e., the prevention sets) is it best to designate as the set of plant vital areas to protect?”  Typi-
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cally, this stage of the VAI includes close coordination with the plant organization responsible 
for physical protection system design.   
Each of the candidate vital area sets identified in the previous step of the VAI process contains a 
minimum complement of systems, personnel, and equipment that must be protected against sabo-
tage.  Licensees might consider factors such as those listed below in the selection of one of the 
candidate vital area sets as the set of areas to be protected: 
1. Impacts on safety and emergency response; 
2. Ease, effectiveness, and cost of protecting the vital areas; and 
3. Reliability of protected SSC and operation actions. 
It is unlikely that one candidate vital area set will receive the highest rating in each of these ar-
eas.  Thus, it will be necessary to make trade-offs between the ratings in the various areas and 
select the candidate vital area set that is the overall best choice.  This can be done using engi-
neering judgment or a more structured analytical approach such as multi-attribute utility theory 
[Ref. 19] or the analytic hierarchy process [Ref. 20].  The following sections provide more de-
tailed discussions of the three considerations listed above in selecting one prevention set as the 
set of vital areas for the plant. 
3.9.1 Safety and Emergency Response Impacts 
Selecting a candidate vital area set can affect plant and personnel safety and emergency response 
in three ways.  First, the access control measures recommended for vital areas can degrade emer-
gency response by lengthening the time required for operators to reach plant equipment in vital 
areas.  Although mitigating actions can be taken (e.g., dropping vital area access controls during 
an emergency), this may actually aid an adversary by granting him access to the remainder of the 
plant once he has initiated a sabotage scenario.  Therefore, in selecting vital areas, preference 
might be given to candidate vital area sets for which access controls would not unduly impede 
operator emergency response actions.   
Second, physical protection access controls can degrade personnel safety by hindering personnel 
evacuation in an emergency.  This concern is less serious than the previous one because it can 
largely be eliminated by the use of appropriate access control hardware (e.g., crash bar doors) 
that does not impede emergency evacuation.  However, care must be taken in limiting the num-
ber of exit and entrances to vital areas that the personnel exit paths do not become so long or so 
complex as to preclude safe egress in an emergency.  Therefore, in selecting vital areas, prefer-
ence might be given to candidate vital area sets for which minimization of entrances and exits 
would not unduly impede personnel egress during an emergency.  In evaluating impediments to 
emergency egress, the VAI analyst should consider the accident environment (e.g., lighting, visi-
bility, and walking surfaces) under which personnel may need to exit an area. 
Third, physical protection measures may require the use of firearms to prevent an adversary from 
entering or carrying out malicious acts in a vital area.  Discharging firearms in a nuclear plant 
can pose a number of hazards to plant and personnel safety.  The hazards to plant safety include 
inadvertent disabling of equipment or instrumentation.  The hazards to personnel safety include 
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rupturing of lines containing hazardous materials (e.g., steam, pressurized water, or chemicals) 
and inadvertent friendly fire.  These hazards should be reviewed in the development of tactics to 
respond to attempted or actual intrusions into vital areas and the configuration of defensive posi-
tions.  While the discussion of protection measures is beyond the scope of VAI in the selection of 
vital areas to protect, preference might be given to candidate vital area sets for which the hazards 
associated with firearm discharges are less serious or can be minimized without undue impact on 
plant operations or safety. 
3.9.2 Ease, Effectiveness, and Cost of Protection 
Requirements for measures to protect vital areas are discussed in 10 CFR 73.55.  It may be easier 
or less expensive to apply these protection measures to the areas in one candidate vital area set 
than to those in another.  For example, by virtue of their construction and location, some candi-
date vital area sets may be able to meet the requirement for bullet-resisting walls, doors, ceiling, 
and floor, while other sets might require modification to meet those requirements.  The licensee 
may consider the ease, effectiveness, and cost of protection in rating candidate vital area sets.   
3.9.3 SSC and Operator Action Reliability 
Where facilities have diverse means of accomplishing safety, the systems in different candidate 
vital area sets or operator actions performed in them may have different reliability.  In such 
cases, preference in the selection of vital area sets to be protected might be given to candidate 
vital area sets that contain higher reliability systems or actions.  This reduces the likelihood that 
the system protected in vital areas would experience random failure concurrent with a malicious 
act, reduces the need for entry into the areas for maintenance activities therefore reducing the 
impact on operations, and increases the likelihood that operator actions will be completed suc-
cessfully.   
3.9.4 Results 
The results of this analysis should include: 
• A table that evaluates each of the candidate vital area sets in terms of each of the attrib-
utes considered in the selection of a vital area set to be protected, and documents the rat-
ing of each of the candidate vital area sets. 
• A recommended vital area set to be protected with the best rating. 
These results should be documented and retained as part of the VAI document of record. 
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4. DOCUMENTATION OF VITAL AREA IDENTIFICATION RESULTS 
Thorough documentation should be developed for each step in the VAI process.  The analysis, 
by its nature, generates information that could be quite valuable to an adversary.  Accordingly, 
appropriate information protection requirements and procedures should be developed and applied 
to both the analysis report and other documentation generated during the course of the VAI.  The 
specific nature of these protection requirements and procedures are discussed in 10 CFR 73.21.  
All team members should receive training in these measures. 
The analysis documentation should be well structured, clear, and easy to follow, to review, and 
to update.  Updates or extensions may be needed to address changes in the capabilities of the 
DBT; the types of IEMOs or disablement events the DBT can accomplish and the locations from 
which it can accomplish them; plant layout; plant operations; safety systems and measures; and 
the locations of SSC and operator actions.  The documentation should explicitly present how the 
assumptions in Section 2 are addressed. 
In the report (or by reference to available material), the documentation should provide all the 
necessary information to reconstruct the results of the analysis.  The plant management should 
have a clear understanding of the elements of the report that are viewed as licensee or applicant 
commitments by the NRC and that will require NRC approval for changes.   
The sequence of each analysis documented in the report should follow the order in which the 
analysis was performed.  That is: 
• Identification of inventories of radioactive material for which vital areas are re-
quired; 
• Identification of IEMOs; 
• Top-level sabotage fault tree development; 
• System sabotage fault tree branch development; 
• Sabotage location determination; 
• Identification of area target sets; 
• Identification of candidate vital area sets; and 
• Recommendation of a set of vital areas to be protected. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The process presented in this document provides a structured, logical approach to identifying the 
vital areas of a nuclear power plant.  The vital areas contain a minimum complement of SSC and 
operator actions sufficient to ensure safe operation or safe shutdown of the plant.  The method 
incorporates information from plant safety documentation, including PRAs.  It employs fault tree 
analysis to deal with the complexity of a nuclear power plant and to document the logic em-
ployed in the identification of vital areas.  The process allows the licensee or applicant to select 
the set of vital areas that meets the requirement for protection against radiological sabotage while 
minimizing impacts of physical protection measures on plant safety, costs, and operations.  
Proper documentation of the process will provide the necessary information to reconstruct the 
results of the analysis to support review, approval, and updating of the vital area selection.   
 
 38
6. REFERENCES 
1. 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73.2. 
2. 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73.55. 
3. Drayton D. Boozer, et. al., “Safeguards System Effectiveness Modeling,” SAND76-0428, 
Albuquerque, NM, 1976. 
4. G. Bruce Varnado and N. R. Ortiz, Fault Tree Analysis for Vital Area Identification, 
NUREG/CR-0809, SAND79-0946, Albuquerque, NM, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, Washington, DC, June 1979. 
5. G. Bruce Varnado and Roy A. Haarman, “Vital Area Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants,” 
SAND80-0553C, Albuquerque, NM, 1980. 
6. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Vital Equipment/Area Guidelines Study: Vital Area 
Committee Report, NUREG-1178, February 1988. 
7. Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-99-024, “Recommendations of the Safeguards 
Performance Assessment Task Force,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 29, 1999. 
8. International Atomic Energy Agency, Identification of Vital Areas at Nuclear Facilities, 
IAEA-NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES-XXXX, IAEA, Vienna, June 2005 (Draft). 
9. John Hockert and David F. Beck, A systematic Method for Identifying Vital Areas at Com-
plex Nuclear Facilities, SAND2004-2866, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, 
May 2005. 
10. USNRC, Nuclear Power Plant Security Assessment Format and Content Guide, Washington, 
DC, September 2007. 
11. 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100. 
12. NS-R-1, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vi-
enna, Austria, 2000. 
13. USNRC, PRA Procedures Guide, A Guide to the Performance of Probabilistic Risk Assess-
ments for Nuclear Power Plants, Final Report, Vols. 1 and 2, NUREG/CR-2300, January 
1983. 
14. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for 
Nuclear Power Plant Applications, ASME-RAS-2002, April 5, 2002. 
15. Procedures for Conducting Probabilistic Safety Assessments of Nuclear Power Plants (Level 
1), Safety Series No. 50-P-4, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria, 1992. 
16. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Fault Tree Analysis Handbook,” NUREG-0492, 
Washington, DC, USA, 1981. 
17. USNRC, Nuclear Power Plant Security Assessment Technical Manual, SAND2007-5591, 
Washington, DC, September 2007. 
18. R.B. Worrell and D.P. Blanchard, “Top Event Prevention Analysis: A Deterministic Use of 
PRA,” International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment Methodology and Appli-
cation, Seoul, Korea, Nov. 26–30, 1995. 
19. R. L. Keeny and H. Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value 
Tradeoffs, Wiley, New York (1976). 
20. Thomas L. Saaty, Decision Making for Leaders, Vol. II, AHP Series, RWS Publications, Pittsburg, 
PA (2002). 
 
 
 
 
 39
 
 
 40
DISTRIBUTION 
# of copies Mailstop Name, Org 
 
5    Albert Tardiff 
    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
    MS T4F25M 
    11545 Rockville Pike 
    Rockville, MD 20852  
  
1  MS0759 Biringer, Betty  6461 
1  MS0759 Green, Mary   6411 
1  MS1361 Matter, John   6754 
5  MS1361 Varnado, Bruce  6754 
1  MS9018 Central Technical Files 8944 (electronic copy) 
1  MS0899 Technical Library  9536 (electronic copy)
 41
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
